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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-2712 
 ___________ 
 
DANIEL DELKER, 
                                 Appellant 
 
v. 
 
C/O BLAKER; C/O CHARLES PLUCK; 
C/O “ROCKY” KING; MAJOR GRAINEY 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2:09-cv-00710) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 19, 2012 
 
 Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed: November 6, 2012 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Daniel Delker, an inmate of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals pro se 
the District Court’s adverse judgment in his civil-rights suit.  We will affirm. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we will only briefly recite the facts of 
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the case, which were set out at length in the relevant District Court opinions.1
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of review is 
complicated, however, by Delker’s opening brief, which does not clearly state the issues 
he wants to preserve for review.  We have repeatedly emphasized that, when addressing 
the claims of a pro se litigant, we have a special obligation to construe his submissions 
liberally.  
  In his 
second amended complaint and with the assistance of counsel, Delker alleged pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the defendants—employees of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections—violated his Eighth Amendment rights during an inter-prison transfer in 
June 2008.  Specifically, Delker claimed that he was unjustifiably beaten, that the non-
participating defendants failed to intervene during the beating, and that two defendants 
had entered into a conspiracy to bring about the incident.  The District Court granted, in 
part, the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, eliminating the failure-to-intervene 
claims (which eliminated all claims against defendant Pluck) and the conspiracy claim 
against defendant King, but allowing all other allegations to stand.  After significant 
pretrial motions practice, a three-day trial was held in April 2012; the jury ultimately 
found in favor of the defendants on all counts.  Delker timely appealed the District 
Court’s order of judgment. 
See Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).  
That an appellant’s filings are difficult to understand does not relieve us or opposing 
counsel of the duty to discern what he wishes to challenge.  Id.
                                                 
1 See generally Delker v. Blaker, No. 09–710, 2011 WL 3667285 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 
2011); Delker v. Blaker, No. 09-710, 2011 WL 2601962 (W.D. Pa. June 30, 2011).  
  We are aware, too, of the 
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appellant’s extraordinary term of solitary confinement, see Delker v. McCullough, 103 F. 
App’x 694, 695 (3d Cir. 2004), which likely impedes his ability to access prison 
resources (about which he complains in his submissions) and has probably affected his 
style of communication.  But on a lengthy record such as this, with numerous evidentiary 
rulings and trial considerations, it is incumbent on the appellant to direct our attention to 
matters he would have us address; otherwise, he runs the risk of waiver.  See Timson v. 
Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Kost v. Kozakiewicz
 Delker appears to raise two issues in his opening submission: first, that the 
attorneys who represented him below were unprepared and rendered ineffective 
assistance; second, that the bus used to transport him between prisons was not introduced 
at trial as evidence.  “The general rule in civil cases is that the ineffective assistance of 
counsel is not a basis for appeal or retrial . . . [;] [i]f a client’s chosen counsel performs 
below professionally acceptable standards, with adverse effects on the client's case, the 
client’s remedy is not reversal, but rather a legal malpractice lawsuit against the deficient 
attorney.”  
, 1 F.3d 
176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993). 
Nelson v. Boeing Co., 446 F.3d 1118, 1119 (10th Cir. 2006).  The Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel does not apply in civil proceedings.  
See Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2001).  Therefore, the alleged failures of 
Delker’s attorneys do not provide a basis for disturbing the judgment of the District 
Court.  Also, given the extensive evidence about the bus and the situation surrounding the 
alleged assault introduced before the District Court, we cannot see how inspection of the 
bus itself, assuming logistical feasibility, would have altered the jury’s verdict.  Cf. Fultz 
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v. Dunn, 165 F.3d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1998).  We have also undertaken a plenary review of 
the orders granting partial summary judgment, see Nat’l State Bank v. Fed. Reserve 
Bank, 979 F.2d 1579, 1580 (3d Cir. 1992), and detect no errors therein compelling 
reversal.  See also Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008); Harper v. 
Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1063 (7th Cir. 2005); Smith v. Mensinger
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.  To 
the extent that Delker’s September 20, 2012 filing in support of his appeal can be 
construed as a request for the appointment of counsel, it is denied. 
, 293 F.3d 641, 652 (3d 
Cir. 2002). 
